The Unsaturated Reader

Tag: ukraine

  • World Ahead 2024

    The Economist comes out with its ‘World Ahead’ at the end of every year showcasing its predictions and things to look out for the next year. I have been a regular reader (and viewer) of this annual ritual and the insights have been particularly illuminating. To be fair, they’re not ‘predictions’ in the strict sense of the word but the newspaper’s thoughts on prospective changes for the next three sixty five days have mostly been on point. Or so they make it seem. But in reality, how well have they fared? Does it live up to its hype? 

    The answer is in the affirmative. For instance, the year 2024 was one that was expected to be eventful. And the newspaper did a great job at throwing light on the different issues in different quarters of the world that would the forthcoming twelve months and indirectly weaving them into a narrative that will seem coherent to the eye that sees the big picture. 

    Almost half of the world’s population have gone on (or are going) to vote this year. An incredible statistic but elections are not necessarily a marker of democracy. Sham elections held to gain false legitimacy nationally and internationally have increasingly become the norm under illiberal regimes. The results of US elections are going to be consequential. Europe and Ukraine by extension must prepare for a potential homecoming-of-sorts of a Trump Presidency. China, Trump’s favourite bugbear, is growing albeit slowly. But that doesn’t stop the threat to American unipolarity which has sharply been dwindling. We are witnessing the rise of a multipolar world; America has become an ‘overstretched power’ in the words of Tom Standage, The Economist’s editor. Decoupling with China isn’t easy; manufacturing houses can shift their bases to neighbouring countries like Vietnam and India (China + 1 strategy) but the components are still being sourced from China. And that dependency may not end any time soon. The need to mitigate climate change have driven the West to mineral-rich countries such as Chile, Argentina, Brazil, New Caledonia etc. Middle powers are gaining leverage. As for the global economy—which had been ailing for a while courtesy the pandemic and picked up pace in the wake of the post-pandemic spending boom encouraged by lavish doles and generous spending programmes— it hasn’t cured of the by-large-pandemic-induced inflation curse yet. But long-term high interest rates could affect people and businesses. Artificial intelligence is the latest fad in the town, the new kid in the block about whom some are raving and some are complaining. It can aid the efficient and make a loser of the lazy. It enables faster coding but dishes out faster plagiarism-proof essays too. Powers to orchestrate disinformation campaigns and torpedo job markets can make it less desirable in the immediate future. But Silicon Valley is pumped up; it ain’t waiting for anybody. Zuckerberg is brooding in his idealistic metaverse. The elephant in the room the US keeps trying to ignore, the war in Gaza, may not abate anytime soon despite the killing of several Hamas and Hezbollah terrorists. Much of the world outside the US-AIPAC nexus is becoming sympathetic to the cause of Palestine. Their plight are not going unheard. In such a fractured world, with Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and the like moving to one end and the allies of the West split somewhere in the middle, becoming increasingly skeptical of the US’ agendas, the prospects for a united world are dim. When a squabble comes calling on the shores of Taiwan, will the US come to the latter’s aid? To Asia it has indeed pivoted, but to anchor itself amid China’s string of pearls is the challenge. Sink may it not, wishes the Washington tsars. 

  • A Diplomatic Future for Russia-Ukraine

    As reports roll in of almost 800 civilians sheltering in a chemical factory in Severodonetsk that houses highly explosive material, we are left wondering if there’s any end to this war. This is more dearly felt by the parched nations of Europe — Germany and France — as they struggle to fend off problems caused by the invasion. The heightened fuel prices owing to a Russia-induced global shortage, an asthmatic economy, and a never-before-seen inflation, are prompting them to think the better of Russia. Given that only these two states, and Hungary to an extent (but for other reasons) seem to advocate for a better approach in dealing with Russia, this thought is bound to be submerged in the majority sway.

    But this is not to say that this belief, which doubtless would begin to bite the rest of Europe soon, has little credence to command a change of tack among the Western leadership. Perhaps, it is more pragmatic. If only we perused it a little longer.

    The other camp, comprising the U.S., the U.K., the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), Poland, etc., would go to any lengths to ensure that Russia’s rendered gasping for breath, its economy battered, and Putin sent down to his bunkers once again. To this end, they don’t desire in the least to see anything less than a military victory for Ukraine. However, this elusive military solution that would supposedly culminate in a “humiliation” of Russia does not look feasible nor logical in the long run. For one, a military victory as the U.S. imagines would entail such wide-ranging depletion of resources, and a Europe that’s left raking for survival (due to public resentment caused by spiralling cost of living) that the gratification one earns from seeing the demise of Russia would taste bitter, than sweet. Nor are we in a position to predict what could happen next given Russia’s possession of one-fifths of Ukraine, and Ukrainian forces’ show of bravado on the front lines. To add fuel, Russia has also blockaded Ukraine’s Black Sea ports from where exports of food grains take place, which have alarmed the developing countries’, much of whose well-being depends on the fodder exported by the East European country.

    For economic sanctions to work, it should be implemented without exception or it would do only so much good as to instil a sense of conviction in Putin’s mind that world cannot do without Russian oil. Until a renewable alternative is figured out (which seems far-fetched given the lack of preparation), a majority of the world shall, for the foreseeable future, be at the mercy of Russia’s oil. Against these odds, it only appears too convincing that a diplomatic solution is the best path forward, discounting for the tirades of “insensitivity to Ukrainians’ sufferings” a person who subscribes to this position might have to, again, suffer.

    If this seemingly endless suffering is to cease, the states must pull the strings and put a stop to the war. And if that is to happen, a talk, than a baulk, is our only refuge. 

  • Russia-Ukraine standoff: Now what?

    The victory day is approaching, and Russia seems all ears to the sounds of explosions and precis-artillery shots, for what could be a better commemoration for its victory over Nazi Germany (once upon a time) than a barrage of attacks that would revise and re-establish its military prowess in the world. A truce, that supposedly should take place on the 9th of this month? I doubt if it’s only a mockery of Western notions of power and victory, a charade of all talk and no actions, for which the West, especially the US, is known for. Only if the truth could be more blunter. The Russian army is, literally, struggling. Conscriptions are on the rise and with soldiers being taken into the game without prior appraisal — a manifestation of Putin’s and his aides’ obsession with secrecy (well, what can we expect of a man who routinely escapes to his bunker in fear of death) — the world, and the Russians, even those on the battlefield, are aghast at the modern-day tsar’s recklessness. Disparagement by the commanders have led soldiers to commit grave excesses, the culmination of which we saw in the Bucha massacre. What could be more “heroic” for Mr Putin — the state media is already busy lacing these soldiers’ images with virtual praise garlands; a heroic feat indeed. 

    Would the victory be Russia’s, as in 1945? Time-tested theories of geopolitics and psychology ascertain the negatum. The de-Nazification is being carried out by one who can righty be equated to a Nazi, and that too the most horrendous. 

    With the future of a country as modern as Ukraine being at stake, no Western nation would allow the war to stretch into an unfading yarn through months and years. Apart from the palpitations of zealous TV hosts who cry that, they, the “Christians” are being butchered (like a person who hails from west Asia or Africa — whose vulnerability to war and poverty is dubbed a mere inevitability, if not a commonplace occurrence for what would their lives be were it not for destruction), the reasons for not pushing Ukraine into a state of delirium are pragmatic. For one, the threats a long war such as this, would engender on the borders of Europe and secondly, and more importantly, the dangerous precedent this would set for the rest of the world, a fitting inspiration to the fanatics who sit on the high-end chairs of their nations feeding on their arsonist whims. 

    If Russia fails to hold up in the coming weeks, at least in Donbas, where it purports to have considerable leverage — the first portion of a pie it considers its “own” — Russia will have to hide its face and retreat home, with no booty in their hands. In the event of such a strategic failure, Mr Putin might either back down, call it quits, pull out troops and take a quiet journey home, not including the humiliation his botoxed face will be susceptible to, from calls of ‘war criminal’ to ‘dictator’, only speculative theories can offer us relief about what would happen in Russia, and for the larger community that constitutes it. Or, Mr. Putin could appeal for a full-fledged national mobilisation, enlisting all and sundry into the army, employ every resource it can scour in its arsenal, and chalk up an intense attack on Ukraine. Be it successful or not, it’s the psychology that serves such a decision, and the mentality of a leader who’s fighting his last battle, to save his face (literally) and the helplessness of the many men and women who have no choice but to either abstain or accede to the decisions of the master, is what concerns us, the consequences of the former being particularly acute that no one would wish to choose it, if they consider their lives precious. 

    Well, these hypotheses just remain that, hypotheses. Theories abound, of what might, and might not happen. But it’s the ground reality that attests to the (feigned) pledges of Russia, which will determine Ukraine’s fate.

  • Can Russia really invade Ukraine?

    This is not a question of Russia’s potency, but of whether the Russian bear is willing to gamble with a prospective invasion, its economic and political costs, regardless. Over the last few days, there has been much drama in diplomatic circles with most talks with Russia clogged with hubris, more on the part of latter. Maybe it’s not that, as Joe Biden thinks, Putin simply wants to invade because he really “has to do something.” The strategic calculus that drives Putin’s actions is, in a word, rash — not so much with wanton invasions but with how it wishes to garner support, external or domestic. 

    Theories abound, and most experts suggest that a war is not on the cards. There are many reasons for this, as evinced by the speculations of various observers in different parts of the globe, though we might not be able to soothsay with prescient clarity yet. 

    Some 100,000 troops have amassed at Ukraine’s borders, with a substantial portion being moved into Belarus as well giving Russia significant clout in the event of a war. In fact, the concentration of 56 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG) near Ukraine’s border is the largest troop build-up in Europe since the end of Cold war. Apart from being a ruse to affirm its superpower status, Russia’s threat is a muscular manifestation of its desire to not see Ukraine and other countries that lie on its periphery (like Georgia) from being inducted into the NATO-clique. Moreover, NATO’s military activities and missile systems in eastern Europe are perceived as a threat, because of its reach into the Russian mainland, and Russia wants it all to be rolled back. It also wants NATO to cut all ties it has with Ukraine and other former Soviet Republics. 

    Suppose Russia attempts a full-fledged invasion, what are the likely consequences? A big war as Putin envisages it, the biggest seen in Europe since the 1940s, would cost many lives and bring economic costs. Sanctions would be harsh. In the short-term, Russia would be able to make ends meet, but in the long haul it’d find its throat dry as a bone. The inhabitants of the country, who for no fault of their own, would have to endure penurious hardships, making them more as a consequence, angrier and thirstier for change. For many goods that it produces, it requires component parts that are imported from abroad. In the event of a war, hopes of a thriving industrial base can be buried. Geopolitically, every country, in its neighbourhood and those that lie further apart, will tend to view Russia with Pyrrhonstic eyes, refashioning its dealings with the former Cold war giant appropriately. NATO, who’s already at the wrong end of the stick, will romp up defences tremendously and other hitherto pacifist countries around Russia will consider joining the bloc. What’s more, an invasion would set a dangerous precedent for other countries looking to invade tiny enemies; prospectively, China on Taiwan. Around the world, the guards would be lowered and totalitarian regimes will find little reason to abide by peaceful conduct and proclaim, at least as a facade, the need to preserve human rights. Impunity would blight every part of the globe. America too is not impervious to these pernicious effects. 

    That said, there is enough evidence to safely conclude that an invasion will not take place. For one, Russia’s previous invasions were determined a pragmatic calculus, a set of conditions which a given crisis would have to fulfil in order to prompt a full-scale invasion. Twice during the twenty first century, in the 2008 Georgia invasion as well as 2014 annexation of Crimea, a Ukrainian peninsula, the oddities of the crises were such that Russia did not have to look anywhere before barging next door. Briefly, the five variables on which Russia’s strategic moves rests are: one, trigger — a justifiable cause that beseeches its intervention; two, local/domestic support for its operations — it cannot afford ruffle feathers if the consequences of an imminent war could make Russians potentially poorer and weaker; three, anticipated military reaction — if the destination country’s forces are week, then so much the better for Mr. Putin; four, technical feasibility — losing tons of troops and armaments in a futile battle does not seem like an ideal end; and five, relatively low anticipated political and economic costs — in a tightly interconnected world, which cannot simply do without it, the perils of antagonising other countries are too onerous to be enlisted here. With the close of the cold war, Russia’s diminutive status in the unipolar world is more than evident. It’s at the mercy of the west, no matter how hard it tries to assert its supremacy by cutting off gas pipelines and displaying ostentatiously its fighter jets. Where these five variables were not met, Russia has refrained from invading, as in the case of Estonia. In 2007, the Bronze Soldier event proved a trigger of sorts for a prospective Russian invasion. But it did not budge. For Estonia was a part of NATO and a military operation simply was not feasible. Plus, it did not help any of Russia’s geopolitical imperatives — namely domestic political consolidation, desire to expand its leverage regionally, and the need shield itself from external threats. 

    At present, the smart move would be to keep talking, deliberating with officials from Russia. The west must not be afraid to heap huge sanctions and other detrimental pressures on Russia and must be, more importantly, unequivocal in its support for Ukraine. There are no two ways here. With the threat of an imminent conflict escalating on the ground, the crisis has become more of a zero-sum game, and the west, including the NATO must be willing to pay the risks for alienating Russia and possibly getting beneath its allies’ hair. Moreover, it’s also a question of how far Russia is willing to be pragmatic in the choices that it makes. A war can wreak severe political and economic costs for the Russian bear; a harmonious relationship with the West is its best bet. In this person’s opinion, apart from fear of its strategic imperatives being jeopardised, the threat of ‘war’, the hauteur of its diplomats, is nothing but a subterfuge on the part of Russia to gain the world’s attention and assert its non-existent supremacy. After all, Russia needs to do something, once in a while.