An increasingly “assertive”, “overly ambitious” China posing a “threat”, a “systemic challenge” to the “international rules-based order” — these are the common tropes that fill most headlines these days. But how far do these claims hold water? In line with the perceptions of some commentators, is China acting too “hasty”? Does its recourse to a “muscular” deportment testify to its far-fetched ambitions? Are its misadventures at Eastern Ladakh merely one of those tactics it is implicitly known to embrace during times of internal crises and dissensions? Seeking answers to these and many other contentious questions might help us gain a perspective — in foregrounding the actualities of the realpolitik at play and thus, with even more prudence, in judging the case scenario unfolding in the international arena.
As is well known, the strongest challenge to America’s global supremacy comes from China, the world’s second-largest economy; and in acknowledging this, the US is availing itself of a stratagem etched on the pages of its old playbook — akin to Truman’s doctrine but now with a substitution in its subject place — that of containing China. This will, however, prove to be difficult. Whatsoever may be masqueraded as the case for the tensions — from cyberattacks to Xinjiang to Hong Kong — and the orotund rhetoric that seems to protrude from the leaders of both the states, the bittersweet truth is that the tenor of this economically interdependent world may bode ill for their schemes; for the one who aspires to become a superpower and the other that seeks to constrain it.
China’s successes over the previous decade are not without credence certainly, howsoever it may be hard to swallow. From crippling poverty, amassing some 97.5 percent of its population in 1978, to ending it altogether in 2020, in concert with Xi’s promises, its bustling tech industry, now its military prowess, its achievements are too lofty to ignore. The factors that underpin this concocted rise lie in the years of insular hard work that predate its achievements, as evinced by the Chinese proverb, “hiding brightness, biding time.” At the helm of it all was however a band of leaders, that overlooked and steered its course, while leaving patent traces of that one party’s ideology — the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) — and above all — either in rectifying or upholding — the philosophy of Mao Zedong.
The CPC
Drawing its inspiration from Marx, Lenin, and notably, the idealism of the May Fourth Movement, the CPC took birth on July 1, 1921, in Shanghai, mostly owing to the efforts of two Chinese intellectuals Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu. The Party was premised on the objective of securing “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Dismayed by the rancid corruption that plagued the Kuomintang government, the party posed, figuratively, as a messiah to the young Chinese — a decent alternative in all respects.
In 1927, all hell broke loose when a civil war erupted between the Nationalists — led by Chiang Kai Shek — and the communists. The Kuomintang government massacred thousands of workers and CPC members in Shanghai. In the four encirclement campaigns that succeeded this — which was launched by the nationalists to batter them up— the communists withstood and sometimes deftly evaded all hostilities through their guerrilla tactics. Yet in the next campaign, Chiang’s troops were prepared for more than what one could ask for, while unpropitiously, the CPC disposed of the guerrilla warfare in favour of conventional techniques — all owing to Mao’s oust from the party following the massacre of thousands of peasants in Chiang’s siege of communist bases; consequently, the communists lost it.
But the communists didn’t plan to call it a day yet. Like with every great venture, the one by the nationalists’ too (imperceptibly) boasted of some loopholes — which the communists made use of with an extraordinary hand of dexterity, to embark on what is infamously called as ‘The Long March’. Spanning almost a year, from October 1934 to October 1935, the march was an arduous 12,000 km trek from southeastern to northwestern China, culminating with the establishment of a military base at the Shaanxi Province. Though more than 85000 troops had pledged to stay the course, only a paltry 8000 made it. Nevertheless, the march, as heroical and mythical as it gets, propelled the re-emergence of Mao.
With Mao becoming the leader of the CPC once again, the party’s eyes were on fighting the Japanese in the northwest, with a hope thereby of securing the faith of the people; and admittedly, fought gallantly, did they, for a decade. The CPC thus became credible forerunners of the movement against imperialism in the eyes of the Chinese masses. Subsequently, the civil war resumed and carried on until 1945. It would not be long before the Nationalists are defeated that the People’s Republic of China would be proclaimed with Mao at its helm, and the party, brimming with a membership of 20 million — now the world’s largest political party.
In the same year, the Radio Beijing announced: ’The People’s Liberation Army must liberate all Chinese territories, including Tibet, Xinjiang, Hainan and Taiwan.’ The foreign imperialist powers had made an ebauche of its borders with unilateral invasions and annexations, and so the need to consolidate its territories was profoundly felt, which remained on the party agenda for the first two decades of its rule. The fervour of these objectives is felt to this day, most vividly evinced in the Galwan valley India-China clash that took place in June last year.
Failed Reforms
The most well-known case that fits the aforesaid title is that of “The Great Leap Forward” campaign. Chairman Mao, in 1958, initiated agricultural and economic reforms, intending to replicate the Soviet model of industrialisation. It emphasised manpower than material incentives in the hope that this would help China surpass the technical process of industrialisation, thus bequeathing a full-bore solution to their agricultural and industrial problems. But they missed out on a few caveats. Although it ensured the collectivisation of agriculture, the ground realities were too harsh for the effectuation of the project. The fact — to which they remained deaf — that it was simply inapplicable to a densely populated country with almost zero agricultural surplus itself proved that it was too ambitious a project. Compounded by three consecutive years of natural calamities that left millions of people starving and dying, the programme began to be repealed by 1960, whence the Soviet too withdrew their aid. Dissensions within the party undoubtedly followed this where one set of leaders chalked its failure up to the red-tape bumbledom, while some went even further denouncing the whole ideal of appealing to labour alone. As audacious as it sounds, it is often said that Mao had initiated the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” against the latter set, which too ended on an unremarkable note. In this campaign, many malcontents among the leaders were temporarily purged from the party and in its stead the “Red Guards” were formed whose job was to eject the ideologically impure and elitist elements of the society, which he fathomed as posing a threat to his authority and vision. However, if truth be told, the only end that the revolution brought was the disillusionment of the masses with the government altogether. The disposal of the “Four Olds” metamorphosed into something of a game of political manoeuvre.
New Leadership
With Mao, his quixotic cultural revolution too fell to death. But the sun rose on another land, or rather, on another ideological sphere, though a subset of the former — “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” It was the time when the CPC became a reformist stronghold, primarily under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. In contrast to Mao’s reckless emulation of the Marxist-Leninist model, Deng’s theory was one adapted to Chinese circumstances, pivoted on the objects of throwing doors open to foreign investment and private businesses — a pragmatic strategy to bolster the economy, coming in as and when the time demanded it. This was not the inception of an era of development that is characteristic of the west, but rather one that allowed capital to thrive alongside a centrally planned economy. Resuscitated the economy did it; began growing at a rate never witnessed in the previous decades and the surplus of the same was used to revive the agrarian sector, in which most of the Chinese had been employed. But the augmented growth also brought with it a few offshoots — the enlargement of the wealthy elites, the very class Mao intended to wipe out a decade before. Hereupon, the creation of a truly egalitarian society, as envisaged by the founders, was out of the question.
The Tiananmen Square
It was the hub of a student-led uprising — one that could’ve transmuted into a counter-revolution, as in the case of the nationalist movement that had undergone a sea change in the late 1920s with the fracturing of relations between the communists and the elite landowning class within the Kuomintang government that subsequently propelled the so-called counter-revolution on the part of the communists against Chiang Kai-Shek and his compatriots; only that this time it was by a bunch of young people clamouring for a western-style democracy.
The doomsayers may yell bloody murder, but the accolades to China’s name defies its purported cataclysm: world’s second-largest economy, biggest manufacturing base, hunger and poverty eradicated in totality with a life expectancy of 77 years, just two years short of the United States — in retrospect, this is a monumental achievement given China’s huge population, most falling verging old age, while its counter-part India lurks at 70-71 years. The economy has now grown to $15 trillion and is set to overtake the US economy by 2030. “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” certainly seems to have borne fruits.
For sure the United States does have a challenger to its hegemony, but it’s certainly not one that would invade countries (as in Iraq), impose inhuman economic sanctions (Cuba), or even exude a mere threat of these, at their whims and fancies. A confluence of Daoism and Confucianism, socialism in China pines for harmony over conflict — a testimony to Xi’s words when he asserted on the centenary celebrations of the CPC that never has China subjugated or invaded other lands. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) exemplifies the model of clout China seeks to have over the world, a step up to its becoming a superpower — a status that it wishes to attain through “peaceful means.”
A couple of hindrances lie in its path, however, the most pressing of which is that of US-backed Taiwan, human rights issues in Hong Kong and Xinjiang — for which the western-allied nations have imposed the most stringent sanctions — maritime dispute and the hitherto unresolved territorial dispute with India.
The hotly contested waters of the South China Sea are claimed by several southeast Asian nations such as Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam along with China. The latter has been constructing artificial islands in South China, in an attempt to make a claim over these waters. China may have its way, but merely asserting sovereignty over these human-made islands does not amount to a legal territorial claim, at least as far as UNCLOS is concerned. This is also the reason why the US and the UK have been strolling through the seas — to prevent China from legally claiming the arena.
Too hasty?
To return to a question we had posed in the beginning: that China is being too hasty, trying to gobble more than what it can swallow, is a misguided notion. Its tactical display of assertiveness is one driven by pragmatic considerations — the time has indeed come for china to get out of its insularised space; if not now, it may prove too costly for it.
Daft hopes
The scenario is glib for China at the moment, howsoever puffed up the predictions of it becoming a superpower in popular editorial columns may be. At the very least, it can become a peer of the United States, tiptoeing on an asymmetrical bipolarity that bodes in favour of the US in the decades to come. China trudges far behind the United States, strategically as well as militarily. A Blue Water Navy that would patrol the oceans is already underway but it would take many years before china’s naval capacity poses a challenge to the US’s mighty force. Moreover, a turbulent Southeast Asia adds to its problems, with all coalescing, despite their differences, to ward off the bigger menace – a hegemonic China – for which they look towards America.
That said, there may be limits to how much China can effectively compete with the United States if it seeks to assert itself in all spheres, but the tide cannot be halted, and someday, even if it takes a century from now, the gap between the indisputable superpower and the ‘rising’ superpower will peter out.
The best bet for the US to stymie the rise of China is to effectuate the creation of a multi-polar Asia, one that pertains to the likes of India and Japan, most haughtily flaunted in the establishment of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Although the US cannot expect India’s policies to conform to its resolve, keeping the Sino-Indian rivalry intact is an imperative. India will be, unquestionably, drawn into the ruckus; the more China enhances its regional superiority, the more the anguish for India.
The road ahead for China needs to be mown, and how it shall fare in its dubiously incredible goals remain to be seen. Yet, if truth be told, the time has indeed come for China to vaunt its “brightness.”
The Unsaturated Reader 