The Unsaturated Reader

Tag: china

  • A New India in the eyes of the world

    (Originally published on December 16th 2024)

    Last Sunday afternoon, I had the good fortune to attend the launch of a magazine that broaches India’s outlook on world affairs, appropriately titled, “India’s World.” Listening to the always insightful and upbeat Honourable Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar speak was a pleasant experience. The pearls of wisdom he shared on the nuances of (new) India’s foreign policy was illuminating. I will not deny the sense of pride and thrill I felt to be a part of the 1.4 billion people driving the new narrative about India.  

    Prof. Happymon Jacob, one of the founders of the magazine, remarked in his welcome note, “arguments and narratives matter in world politics.” Perhaps Britain’s Keir Starmer needs reminding of this fact whose government has been accused of lacking idealism and crucially a plan. The prim man is averse to media-swashbuckling but a little touch with reality (and politics) wouldn’t hurt. Often more than the work on the ground, it is how you shape the narrative around it that influences public perception and determines the measure of your success. Going back to Prof. Jacob’s remark, the simple adage struck me for its forthrightness. It’s a truth that is sometimes overlooked, and sometimes for its own sake misinterpreted and taken too literally, to the satisfaction of any shrewd world leader who perhaps intended to provoke such a reaction — take Trump’s statement on Ukraine for instance. He proclaimed he will end the war in a day; geopolitics analysts have proven too naive in reading too much into it and basing their (which will soon turn out to be baseless) theories of probable outcomes for Ukraine. 

    That said, returning to the plot line, and the bottomline, of Jaishankar’s speech, which was that India’s current undeniably proactive foreign policy is rooted in pragmatism and historical context. Times have changed, actors in the international arena have ebbed and flowed, the tools for conducting geopolitics have upgraded making space for new unlikely but welcome entrants in the field.  Keeping pace with this rapidly changing kshana-kshana world, the way India leads its foreign policy must also change. The present model is neither a break from the past nor an attack on it. It underlines how foreign policies are shaped by contexts, and why a strict adherence to age-old principles that may be outdated for the present, is misguided. It is perhaps time, a section of thinkers, commentators, academicians changed their mindsets. 

    India boasts of a 4-trillion dollar economy and its growth looks unstoppable. To take a tiny statistic, there are around 13 million Indians working abroad and several more, if we add the Indian-origin workers to it — a sign of India’s growing global cultural footprint. She’s a strong, assertive power with significant clout— even a sought-after player in conflict mediation— and the much vaunted (and equally challenged) ‘strategic autonomy’, the shining light. But this is no new-found success. It is buttressed by decades of careful policy-making, calibrating and timely decisions, that set it up for the success it is known for today. 

    Ideally, this burgeoning economy that burst into the global scene in 1991 needs an equally ambitious foreign policy, along the lines of a Viksit Bharat we envision for 2047. That demands proactivity in a world slowly manifesting multi-polarity. We are far from the days of a revamped version of an old-school bipolar world —the place of the diminished Soviet Union being occupied by People’s Republic of China — and may never see it materialise either, at least in our lifetimes. 

    The push into the whirlwind of geopolitics known for its brute realism, is not without its risks and anxieties. As Jaishankar aptly put it, it requires a multifaceted approach which involves striking the right balance between elements of hedging, prudence, collaboration, accelerating multipolarity, juggling between the West and the non-Western world and so on. India is now at a place where it can lead a dialogue on the Global South, find a seat in a G7 meeting, while maintaining its principled-distance and play the role of a peacemaker in the wars and conflicts that ravage the world. 

    On the other end of the spectrum, there are thorny issues or “hangovers” from the past that still ruffle us once in a while, notably the issue of border security. It is imprudent to expect of a country to peacefully pursue its developmental goals insularly while forming well-meaning alliances across the world like your standard homogenous European country, when 38,000 square kilometres of its area has been encroached upon by, if I may drive up the emotional overtone here, an over-bearing neighbour that is on a mission make its mark in every sphere, for good and bad, across the world. 

    Alas, as with any pragmatic relationship, much of the quandary is also about money. China is our biggest trading partner and with whom we run a widening trade deficit. It is definitely a cause for concern but it’s also a fact that cannot be overwritten by ‘hawkish’ narratives, as much as narratives matter. This is why economic diplomacy is just as important. Supply chain remodulation, digital era, enhancing mobility and connectivity for an intermingling world et al are some of the new kids on the block, governments need to be alert and cater to. 

    In the beginning of the lecture Jaishankar noted how Track 1 diplomacy had outpaced Track 2 in the last decade and that too for the good. Think tanks are after all an outlet for ideas of several people that closely tune in to this field. As with any individual therefore, their aggregates too suffer from biases and vestiges of conservatism.

    We should think for the long term and plan for the generations ahead because much is at stake. Importantly, far removed from the elite foreign policy discussion circles and (sometimes) aloof spaces of think tanks and academia, it wouldn’t go amiss to lend a ear to the voice on the Indian street, what the plain old common sense of ordinary folk reveals about India’s role in the world. 

    These are neither trivial nor easy objectives. The truth often lies in the plain and simple, and requires an approach that is direct and discerns the truth and enlivens it. It has only been less than a century since this little nation home to more than a billion, became independent. To have soared so high and outlived the colonial baggage is an indelible achievement. As befits her legacy, a regional hegemon status will add to her laurels. 

  • A no-nonsense 2025

    Saying out loud ‘2024’ has a certain ring to it. 2024 set out with the grand claim of being the year nearly half the world’s population would go to the polling booths. As we close in on the year, the events of the past eleven months have surely satiated the prophesiers. On July 13th, at a rally in Pennsylvania, we were witness to an attempt to assassinate Trump, a worn-out character then. Now here we are. Kopites at the Anfield (yes we are diverting) wept when Jurgen Klopp during that emotional (fawn-y) afternoon on May 20th bid farewell to Liverpool Football Club. The sentimental ones thought he was irreplaceable,  whose fist bumps thundered down the four stands of the Anfield. But here we are. It looks like the bald Dutch-nobody who was slotted into his place (pun intended) isn’t having a bad time after all. Nor is Mr. Trump. 

    To call 2024 eventful in an abstract sense would be trite, for every year is a treasury of events. The four numerals on paper are defined and remembered by the events that make it; it would be a non-existential semantic nonsense without it. Asymmetry of information from different parts of the world and a fundamental distrust are the themes that stood out to me this year. A “mad-man” at the helm of the most powerful country on earth to top it all. And perhaps his tech-genius square-faced acolyte (also known as X-lord). That the electorate has moved to the right is what political observers would say — from the perspective of centrist political parties, there’s some “catching up” to do (Macron comes to mind). Hardcore leftists will say centrists are radical right-wingers disguised in the garb of neo-progressive-conservatism. Maybe they’re right. Maybe not. It is not productive to dwell on such political (nonsense-) semantics again. Practically, it hasn’t reaped much. In the academia, perhaps some fodder for closed-door theoretical debates in unreadable, unaccessible, lofty journals. 

    The big predictions for 2025 have arrived. Did the predictions for 2024 age well? One thing is clear, while at the start of December last year Trump seemed like a remote possibility, the repercussions of such an incident being discussed in a jiffy as a non-negotiable ritual, now it’s become an indigestible reality. The entertainer has catapulted the masses to clinch a soaring victory. No more “didn’t win the popular vote” nonsense, he may have thought; he showed up at the heavy blue states, like his beloved New York for instance, to tilt the popular vote in his favour. Everything that has happened in 2024 appears hazy in comparison to the results on November 4th, for that has and will change the course of everything that is set to happen and gives everything that came before it a bittersweet flavour — on a lighter note, it is the feeling when kids who don’t quite know each other are thrust into the same room as a burly old man. They do not quite belong, yet history will sew them in the grand narrative of the events that preceded (and shaped) the biggest comeback in political history. 

    We all agree on this: Trump is the mad-man in the room. The theory was hypothesised during the time of Richard Nixon to play up his supposed irrationality and volatility in making decisions so that the communist bloc would scamper to avoid a negative reaction from him by cobbling a mutually non-adversarial settlement. This could happen well again, albeit with his NATO or even Chinese counterparts. But make no mistake, because his close aides (who are now off his books) claim that he is pragmatic despite the occasional crankiness and volatility. He’s a supreme entertainer who speaks ‘truth’ the way masses want to hear it. There’s more to Trump than there is, and 2025 will be a testament to that, be it for the good or the bad. 

    A politically suave deal-maker with an incorrigible belief in transactional alliances. Mr. Trump’s economic principles are clear: he wants to make America great again — harkening back to a non-existent mythical past — he’ll not let the trade partners who are apparently ‘cheating’ on America go scot-free, and his answer to any country that may pose a threat to the American economy? Tariffs. How about meeting America’s skyrocketing debt levels? Tariffs; making up for proposed tax cuts in revenue? Tariffs. As Tom Standage, the Economist’s deputy editor put it, Trump thinks Tariffs are some kind of magic money tree. The less exciting aspect of it is that it’s going to drive up prices for ordinary Americans. Legend has it that many of his supporters figured out what tariffs meant after the election. 

    All in all, the US has become an overstretched power. The gap between what the US is capable of, and the demands placed on it — which is usually expected of it — will grow in 2025. A snarky White House establishment will have much reckoning to do with a non-quite-in-its-control world order. 

    A big player, if not the big player, in that hitherto novel world order is China. To be fair, for all its autocracy and anti-western ideals, China does boast of some good ideas and achievements. That it may have gorged on coal is one thing, but it is at the forefront in the adoption of renewable energy technologies. It is host to the world’s biggest reserves of rare earth. Just how the US closed its doors to exports of semiconductor technology to Beijing, the latter is pepped up for a tit-for-tat. The imposition of tariffs next year could mark the intensification of an already fierce trading rivalry. Companies in the US can still boast of an edge in chip-making — they’re designed in America and manufactured in China’s estranged sibling, Taiwan — but this has only emboldened China to produce better (even less pricier) alternatives. Some of the best semiconductor models in the industry are Chinese. The US may no longer have a monopoly over, simply, chips. 

    It has become trendy for world leaders to proclaim that they must decouple their economies. Often the villain is China. But Europe has also been quietly insisting on becoming independent from the big guy across the Atlantic too. The idealistic centrist Macron has been the most vociferous advocate of it. Alas, only if the efforts to realise it could compare to the grand pronouncements. Decoupling is hard; factories and industries are not lego blocks to be removed and propped up anywhere we please. We are talking about cars and electronics. There are costs, contracts, relations, and even livelihoods at stake. Companies can’t jet off to any country as soon as it shows prospects of a burgeoning, cheap labour force. 

    Therefore, whether we like it or not, it is an interconnected world, with a few destructible walls erected here and there. Europe this year has been strikingly averse to tourism; Catalans with heads in their hands are storming the streets every month or so with anti-tourist protests. The main argument is that tourists are driving up local rental prices; more like rentiers want to lease rooms and apartments to once-in-a-lifetime visitors who are willing to pay more than local inhabitants. In this writer’s opinion, it should be a matter of regulative policies and incentives. The angst is misdirected. But this emotional disequilibrium has cleared the way for new entrants: enter the oil-giants of the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has been promoting tourism in a bid to diversify its oil-dependent economy. Along with hosting football world cup, Usyk vs Fury, a 38-something Cristiano Ronaldo… choke, choke, did I mention LIV Golf? 

    Global debts have swelled, in large part fuelled by pandemic-era spending. Many advanced economies have unsustainable deficits (honourable mention: USA) — could this entice a move to austerity? America under Trump will like to remain aloof, oblivious to the wars of the world — some of which it has had a tiny hand in — and as solipsists would have it, focus inwards. This will prompt many countries to jack up their spending on defence. Space is becoming militarised (and cluttered). This turn of events will not dent the US economy or the image of its strong economy however. Expect a capital influx into Uncle Sam’s economy; the dopamine shot of a MAGA homecoming has been irresistible for investors. 

    The fate of Crypto is a little shaky. Artificial intelligence has not (yet) lived up to its hype. More than $1 trillion have been poured into AI infrastructure. The investors are becoming wary . But it could be precisely when the latter becomes disillusioned that the technology might pick up — the same was said of crypto, but again, here we are. It could make or break the future. The bottomline, as with domestic and geo-politics, is to expect the unbelievable. For one, who thought the sponge-bob-faced Elon Musk who starred in a sensible guest role in the mighty Big Bang Theory years ago would head a government department titled ‘DOGE’ with another square-faced (slightly smaller) pretentious eccentric (you-know-who)? 

    Hardcore realism is the fad — why would the plebeian not fancy a bit of combative politics? — with its attendant unnerving social phenomena — hear ‘racismo’? A transactional world than an ideological world; differences in ideology does not necessarily beget a reset in trade ties unlike alignments in the cold war era. Putin doesn’t think the rules apply to him, much to the delight of his autocrat-admirers around the world. The BRICS truly are a motley of strange bedfellows; the only principle that holds them together is their shared suspicion of the West regardless of their internal skirmishes — China was sitting in India’s backyard until very recently a deescalation-agreement of sorts was cobbled up. 

    And lastly, but certainly the irritant Democrats had at the top of their heads during the middle of the year— Biden’s age and his fragility and as with age, his adamance to step down from candidature. In a survey reported by The Economist, more rich/democratic/both countries around the world seem to favour younger leaders. A breath of fresh air, youth, dynamism is being preferred to the same-old-stock of politicians. The notable exception of course is America. Well, if Trump thinks he is as young as JD Vance, and his supporters chime in, who’s stopping him? Coming to the practical aspect of the issue, much of the rich world is ageing and China seeks to work around it by encouraging a silver economy — a market economy that caters to the old. The point is to shift the perception about them being a ‘burden’ on the economy by accommodating them in economically productive ways. Japan’s baby boomers, who’ll cross an average age of 75 next year, can look forward to something similar if the plan materialises as intended. 

    There it is, fresh perspectives for an unrevealed, neatly packed 2025. Change, turbulence, technological optimism (and doomsaying) are expected to prevail, but what unites humans from across the political spectrum is hope. The hope for change. What may be progress for one lot, could be destruction for the other. But it’s hope in its positive connotation that dones different hats that’s the shared emotion. Every person has an ideology, for indifference is also an ideology. And for all that 2024 has given us, we can be certain (and if you’re into that sort of thing,’hope’) that 2025 will be no less interesting, if not more. We are humans and it doesn’t hurt to be incorrigible optimists—at least until you reach the last word of this muse— so here’s to a no-nonsense 2025! 

  • World Ahead 2024

    The Economist comes out with its ‘World Ahead’ at the end of every year showcasing its predictions and things to look out for the next year. I have been a regular reader (and viewer) of this annual ritual and the insights have been particularly illuminating. To be fair, they’re not ‘predictions’ in the strict sense of the word but the newspaper’s thoughts on prospective changes for the next three sixty five days have mostly been on point. Or so they make it seem. But in reality, how well have they fared? Does it live up to its hype? 

    The answer is in the affirmative. For instance, the year 2024 was one that was expected to be eventful. And the newspaper did a great job at throwing light on the different issues in different quarters of the world that would the forthcoming twelve months and indirectly weaving them into a narrative that will seem coherent to the eye that sees the big picture. 

    Almost half of the world’s population have gone on (or are going) to vote this year. An incredible statistic but elections are not necessarily a marker of democracy. Sham elections held to gain false legitimacy nationally and internationally have increasingly become the norm under illiberal regimes. The results of US elections are going to be consequential. Europe and Ukraine by extension must prepare for a potential homecoming-of-sorts of a Trump Presidency. China, Trump’s favourite bugbear, is growing albeit slowly. But that doesn’t stop the threat to American unipolarity which has sharply been dwindling. We are witnessing the rise of a multipolar world; America has become an ‘overstretched power’ in the words of Tom Standage, The Economist’s editor. Decoupling with China isn’t easy; manufacturing houses can shift their bases to neighbouring countries like Vietnam and India (China + 1 strategy) but the components are still being sourced from China. And that dependency may not end any time soon. The need to mitigate climate change have driven the West to mineral-rich countries such as Chile, Argentina, Brazil, New Caledonia etc. Middle powers are gaining leverage. As for the global economy—which had been ailing for a while courtesy the pandemic and picked up pace in the wake of the post-pandemic spending boom encouraged by lavish doles and generous spending programmes— it hasn’t cured of the by-large-pandemic-induced inflation curse yet. But long-term high interest rates could affect people and businesses. Artificial intelligence is the latest fad in the town, the new kid in the block about whom some are raving and some are complaining. It can aid the efficient and make a loser of the lazy. It enables faster coding but dishes out faster plagiarism-proof essays too. Powers to orchestrate disinformation campaigns and torpedo job markets can make it less desirable in the immediate future. But Silicon Valley is pumped up; it ain’t waiting for anybody. Zuckerberg is brooding in his idealistic metaverse. The elephant in the room the US keeps trying to ignore, the war in Gaza, may not abate anytime soon despite the killing of several Hamas and Hezbollah terrorists. Much of the world outside the US-AIPAC nexus is becoming sympathetic to the cause of Palestine. Their plight are not going unheard. In such a fractured world, with Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and the like moving to one end and the allies of the West split somewhere in the middle, becoming increasingly skeptical of the US’ agendas, the prospects for a united world are dim. When a squabble comes calling on the shores of Taiwan, will the US come to the latter’s aid? To Asia it has indeed pivoted, but to anchor itself amid China’s string of pearls is the challenge. Sink may it not, wishes the Washington tsars. 

  • The Ticking Bomb in Taiwan

    If there’s one country that deserves to be recognised as one by all states alike, and appreciated for its bravery – an apt example for why size does not determine might – it is Taiwan. Only a handful of countries have established diplomatic ties with Taiwan, the likes of which include four small Pacific islands (possibly wary of their big neighbour’s economic and military clout), a few Central American and Caribbean nations. Honduras is the latest nation to have switched recognition to China. Those that relent to having Taiwan’s embassies opened in their countries, would rather not call it by its name. “Chinese Taipei”, they call it for fear of antagonising the big red power, whose words threatening to cut trade ties would mark the demise of their economies. Even otherwise, China’s leverage has been growing. For instance, last week Saudi Arabia called upon China to help broker a deal with their long-standing rival (and nuclear-capable) Iran. The Saudis could’ve been sending a signal to the West that they have other options to count on if the West remains blasé about taming Iran. How far this signalling has been provocative to the West is questionable given that the US still commands significant authority in the region, one that’ll take China many years, if not never, to cross over.

    Politically, Taiwan may be in a fraught situation. But economically, China needs Taiwan, as much as the latter needs the former. China considers Taiwan its own — a recalcitrant son who fled his family influenced by the western mythic but who nevertheless needs some caning. For seventy years, they oversaw something of a peace that was always on the verge of falling through. China never lets go off any opportunity of intimidating Taiwan, even if it had no reason to. In a show of force last year, China conducted exercises circling Taiwan —military muscle-flexing around an island that is just about 0.37% of its size — following US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s contentious visit.

    As this blogger writes this article, Taiwan’s current president Tsai Ing-wen has touched down New York calling US-Taiwan relations “closer than ever.” It is only a matter of time before China steps up its now routine military forays across the Taiwan strait pointing out the ‘dangerous’ aspirations of the island democracy. But more condemnation would only bind the Taiwanese stronger. Turns out a majority in Taiwan were supportive of Pelosi’s visit. Despite the KMT’s calls for unison with the mainland in the name of ethnicity, more and more members of the self-governing island would refrain from identifying themselves with those in the mainland as the country grows more authoritarian under Xi Jinping. Only time can predict what comes off this tangled and menacing hate-love relationship that has become the locus of a renewed geopolitical tussle years after the last great power confrontation that drew the curtains in 1990. The clamour for independence is becoming too loud for the Chinese Communist Party to bear, yet the trade and tourism ties forged by the KMT before the takeover of the Tsai Ing-Wen in 2016 gives hope to those urging on a diplomatic conciliation with China, than an ugly confrontation that would see all major powers intervene. An economically well-to-do nation does not have much to worry, especially when it has firms around the world knocking on its doors for chips. Its semiconductor manufacturing success is one that’s difficult to emulate and which its closely guards, establishing a name for itself in the global arena. It is in the interest of the Chinese to keep animosity at bay (literally) and not attempt unpleasant flexing around the island. In a country that harps on the call for independence day in and day out, this is the most provocative thing it can do. The status quo however doesn’t help much either. The best option is perhaps is to leave Taiwan to its own, and gradually yield to the will of the people. Such an action however demands a little less ego, and a little more thoughtfulness.

  • On China

    An increasingly “assertive”, “overly ambitious” China posing a “threat”, a “systemic challenge” to the “international rules-based order” — these are the common tropes that fill most headlines these days. But how far do these claims hold water? In line with the perceptions of some commentators, is China acting too “hasty”? Does its recourse to a “muscular” deportment testify to its far-fetched ambitions? Are its misadventures at Eastern Ladakh merely one of those tactics it is implicitly known to embrace during times of internal crises and dissensions? Seeking answers to these and many other contentious questions might help us gain a perspective — in foregrounding the actualities of the realpolitik at play and thus, with even more prudence, in judging the case scenario unfolding in the international arena. 

    As is well known, the strongest challenge to America’s global supremacy comes from China, the world’s second-largest economy; and in acknowledging this, the US is availing itself of a stratagem etched on the pages of its old playbook — akin to Truman’s doctrine but now with a substitution in its subject place — that of containing China. This will, however, prove to be difficult. Whatsoever may be masqueraded as the case for the tensions — from cyberattacks to Xinjiang to Hong Kong — and the orotund rhetoric that seems to protrude from the leaders of both the states, the bittersweet truth is that the tenor of this economically interdependent world may bode ill for their schemes; for the one who aspires to become a superpower and the other that seeks to constrain it. 

    China’s successes over the previous decade are not without credence certainly, howsoever it may be hard to swallow. From crippling poverty, amassing some 97.5 percent of its population in 1978, to ending it altogether in 2020, in concert with Xi’s promises, its bustling tech industry, now its military prowess, its achievements are too lofty to ignore. The factors that underpin this concocted rise lie in the years of insular hard work that predate its achievements, as evinced by the Chinese proverb, “hiding brightness, biding time.” At the helm of it all was however a band of leaders, that overlooked and steered its course, while leaving patent traces of that one party’s ideology — the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) — and above all — either in rectifying or upholding — the philosophy of Mao Zedong. 

    The CPC

    Drawing its inspiration from Marx, Lenin, and notably, the idealism of the May Fourth Movement, the CPC took birth on July 1, 1921, in Shanghai, mostly owing to the efforts of two Chinese intellectuals Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu. The Party was premised on the objective of securing “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Dismayed by the rancid corruption that plagued the Kuomintang government, the party posed, figuratively, as a messiah to the young Chinese — a decent alternative in all respects.

    In 1927, all hell broke loose when a civil war erupted between the Nationalists — led by Chiang Kai Shek — and the communists. The Kuomintang government massacred thousands of workers and CPC members in Shanghai. In the four encirclement campaigns that succeeded this — which was launched by the nationalists to batter them up— the communists withstood and sometimes deftly evaded all hostilities through their guerrilla tactics. Yet in the next campaign, Chiang’s troops were prepared for more than what one could ask for, while unpropitiously, the CPC disposed of the guerrilla warfare in favour of conventional techniques — all owing to Mao’s oust from the party following the massacre of thousands of peasants in Chiang’s siege of communist bases; consequently, the communists lost it. 

    But the communists didn’t plan to call it a day yet. Like with every great venture, the one by the nationalists’ too (imperceptibly) boasted of some loopholes — which the communists made use of with an extraordinary hand of dexterity, to embark on what is infamously called as ‘The Long March’. Spanning almost a year, from October 1934 to October 1935, the march was an arduous 12,000 km trek from southeastern to northwestern China, culminating with the establishment of a military base at the Shaanxi Province. Though more than 85000 troops had pledged to stay the course, only a paltry 8000 made it. Nevertheless, the march, as heroical and mythical as it gets, propelled the re-emergence of Mao.  

    With Mao becoming the leader of the CPC once again, the party’s eyes were on fighting the Japanese in the northwest, with a hope thereby of securing the faith of the people; and admittedly, fought gallantly, did they, for a decade. The CPC thus became credible forerunners of the movement against imperialism in the eyes of the Chinese masses. Subsequently, the civil war resumed and carried on until 1945. It would not be long before the Nationalists are defeated that the People’s Republic of China would be proclaimed with Mao at its helm, and the party, brimming with a membership of 20 million — now the world’s largest political party.  

    In the same year, the Radio Beijing announced: ’The People’s Liberation Army must liberate all Chinese territories, including Tibet, Xinjiang, Hainan and Taiwan.’ The foreign imperialist powers had made an ebauche of its borders with unilateral invasions and annexations, and so the need to consolidate its territories was profoundly felt, which remained on the party agenda for the first two decades of its rule. The fervour of these objectives is felt to this day, most vividly evinced in the Galwan valley India-China clash that took place in June last year. 

    Failed Reforms

    The most well-known case that fits the aforesaid title is that of “The Great Leap Forward” campaign. Chairman Mao, in 1958, initiated agricultural and economic reforms, intending to replicate the Soviet model of industrialisation. It emphasised manpower than material incentives in the hope that this would help China surpass the technical process of industrialisation, thus bequeathing a full-bore solution to their agricultural and industrial problems. But they missed out on a few caveats. Although it ensured the collectivisation of agriculture, the ground realities were too harsh for the effectuation of the project. The fact — to which they remained deaf — that it was simply inapplicable to a densely populated country with almost zero agricultural surplus itself proved that it was too ambitious a project. Compounded by three consecutive years of natural calamities that left millions of people starving and dying, the programme began to be repealed by 1960, whence the Soviet too withdrew their aid. Dissensions within the party undoubtedly followed this where one set of leaders chalked its failure up to the red-tape bumbledom, while some went even further denouncing the whole ideal of appealing to labour alone. As audacious as it sounds, it is often said that Mao had initiated the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” against the latter set, which too ended on an unremarkable note. In this campaign, many malcontents among the leaders were temporarily purged from the party and in its stead the “Red Guards” were formed whose job was to eject the ideologically impure and elitist elements of the society, which he fathomed as posing a threat to his authority and vision. However, if truth be told, the only end that the revolution brought was the disillusionment of the masses with the government altogether. The disposal of the “Four Olds” metamorphosed into something of a game of political manoeuvre. 

    New Leadership

    With Mao, his quixotic cultural revolution too fell to death. But the sun rose on another land, or rather, on another ideological sphere, though a subset of the former — “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” It was the time when the CPC became a reformist stronghold, primarily under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. In contrast to Mao’s reckless emulation of the Marxist-Leninist model, Deng’s theory was one adapted to Chinese circumstances, pivoted on the objects of throwing doors open to foreign investment and private businesses — a pragmatic strategy to bolster the economy, coming in as and when the time demanded it. This was not the inception of an era of development that is characteristic of the west, but rather one that allowed capital to thrive alongside a centrally planned economy. Resuscitated the economy did it; began growing at a rate never witnessed in the previous decades and the surplus of the same was used to revive the agrarian sector, in which most of the Chinese had been employed. But the augmented growth also brought with it a few offshoots — the enlargement of the wealthy elites, the very class Mao intended to wipe out a decade before. Hereupon, the creation of a truly egalitarian society, as envisaged by the founders, was out of the question. 

    The Tiananmen Square

    It was the hub of a student-led uprising — one that could’ve transmuted into a counter-revolution, as in the case of the nationalist movement that had undergone a sea change in the late 1920s with the fracturing of relations between the communists and the elite landowning class within the Kuomintang government that subsequently propelled the so-called counter-revolution on the part of the communists against Chiang Kai-Shek and his compatriots; only that this time it was by a bunch of young people clamouring for a western-style democracy. 

    The doomsayers may yell bloody murder, but the accolades to China’s name defies its purported cataclysm: world’s second-largest economy, biggest manufacturing base, hunger and poverty eradicated in totality with a life expectancy of 77 years, just two years short of the United States — in retrospect, this is a monumental achievement given China’s huge population, most falling verging old age, while its counter-part India lurks at 70-71 years. The economy has now grown to $15 trillion and is set to overtake the US economy by 2030. “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” certainly seems to have borne fruits. 

    For sure the United States does have a challenger to its hegemony, but it’s certainly not one that would invade countries (as in Iraq), impose inhuman economic sanctions (Cuba), or even exude a mere threat of these, at their whims and fancies. A confluence of Daoism and Confucianism, socialism in China pines for harmony over conflict — a testimony to Xi’s words when he asserted on the centenary celebrations of the CPC that never has China subjugated or invaded other lands. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) exemplifies the model of clout China seeks to have over the world, a step up to its becoming a superpower — a status that it wishes to attain through “peaceful means.” 

    A couple of hindrances lie in its path, however, the most pressing of which is that of US-backed Taiwan, human rights issues in Hong Kong and Xinjiang — for which the western-allied nations have imposed the most stringent sanctions — maritime dispute and the hitherto unresolved territorial dispute with India. 

    The hotly contested waters of the South China Sea are claimed by several southeast Asian nations such as Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam along with China. The latter has been constructing artificial islands in South China, in an attempt to make a claim over these waters. China may have its way, but merely asserting sovereignty over these human-made islands does not amount to a legal territorial claim, at least as far as UNCLOS is concerned. This is also the reason why the US and the UK have been strolling through the seas — to prevent China from legally claiming the arena.

    Too hasty?

    To return to a question we had posed in the beginning: that China is being too hasty, trying to gobble more than what it can swallow, is a misguided notion. Its tactical display of assertiveness is one driven by pragmatic considerations — the time has indeed come for china to get out of its insularised space; if not now, it may prove too costly for it. 

    Daft hopes

    The scenario is glib for China at the moment, howsoever puffed up the predictions of it becoming a superpower in popular editorial columns may be. At the very least, it can become a peer of the United States, tiptoeing on an asymmetrical bipolarity that bodes in favour of the US in the decades to come. China trudges far behind the United States, strategically as well as militarily. A Blue Water Navy that would patrol the oceans is already underway but it would take many years before china’s naval capacity poses a challenge to the US’s mighty force. Moreover, a turbulent Southeast Asia adds to its problems, with all coalescing, despite their differences, to ward off the bigger menace – a hegemonic China – for which they look towards America. 

    That said, there may be limits to how much China can effectively compete with the United States if it seeks to assert itself in all spheres, but the tide cannot be halted, and someday, even if it takes a century from now, the gap between the indisputable superpower and the ‘rising’ superpower will peter out. 

    The best bet for the US to stymie the rise of China is to effectuate the creation of a multi-polar Asia, one that pertains to the likes of India and Japan, most haughtily flaunted in the establishment of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Although the US cannot expect India’s policies to conform to its resolve, keeping the Sino-Indian rivalry intact is an imperative. India will be, unquestionably, drawn into the ruckus; the more China enhances its regional superiority, the more the anguish for India. 

    The road ahead for China needs to be mown, and how it shall fare in its dubiously incredible goals remain to be seen. Yet, if truth be told, the time has indeed come for China to vaunt its “brightness.”