This is not a question of Russia’s potency, but of whether the Russian bear is willing to gamble with a prospective invasion, its economic and political costs, regardless. Over the last few days, there has been much drama in diplomatic circles with most talks with Russia clogged with hubris, more on the part of latter. Maybe it’s not that, as Joe Biden thinks, Putin simply wants to invade because he really “has to do something.” The strategic calculus that drives Putin’s actions is, in a word, rash — not so much with wanton invasions but with how it wishes to garner support, external or domestic.
Theories abound, and most experts suggest that a war is not on the cards. There are many reasons for this, as evinced by the speculations of various observers in different parts of the globe, though we might not be able to soothsay with prescient clarity yet.
Some 100,000 troops have amassed at Ukraine’s borders, with a substantial portion being moved into Belarus as well giving Russia significant clout in the event of a war. In fact, the concentration of 56 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG) near Ukraine’s border is the largest troop build-up in Europe since the end of Cold war. Apart from being a ruse to affirm its superpower status, Russia’s threat is a muscular manifestation of its desire to not see Ukraine and other countries that lie on its periphery (like Georgia) from being inducted into the NATO-clique. Moreover, NATO’s military activities and missile systems in eastern Europe are perceived as a threat, because of its reach into the Russian mainland, and Russia wants it all to be rolled back. It also wants NATO to cut all ties it has with Ukraine and other former Soviet Republics.
Suppose Russia attempts a full-fledged invasion, what are the likely consequences? A big war as Putin envisages it, the biggest seen in Europe since the 1940s, would cost many lives and bring economic costs. Sanctions would be harsh. In the short-term, Russia would be able to make ends meet, but in the long haul it’d find its throat dry as a bone. The inhabitants of the country, who for no fault of their own, would have to endure penurious hardships, making them more as a consequence, angrier and thirstier for change. For many goods that it produces, it requires component parts that are imported from abroad. In the event of a war, hopes of a thriving industrial base can be buried. Geopolitically, every country, in its neighbourhood and those that lie further apart, will tend to view Russia with Pyrrhonstic eyes, refashioning its dealings with the former Cold war giant appropriately. NATO, who’s already at the wrong end of the stick, will romp up defences tremendously and other hitherto pacifist countries around Russia will consider joining the bloc. What’s more, an invasion would set a dangerous precedent for other countries looking to invade tiny enemies; prospectively, China on Taiwan. Around the world, the guards would be lowered and totalitarian regimes will find little reason to abide by peaceful conduct and proclaim, at least as a facade, the need to preserve human rights. Impunity would blight every part of the globe. America too is not impervious to these pernicious effects.
That said, there is enough evidence to safely conclude that an invasion will not take place. For one, Russia’s previous invasions were determined a pragmatic calculus, a set of conditions which a given crisis would have to fulfil in order to prompt a full-scale invasion. Twice during the twenty first century, in the 2008 Georgia invasion as well as 2014 annexation of Crimea, a Ukrainian peninsula, the oddities of the crises were such that Russia did not have to look anywhere before barging next door. Briefly, the five variables on which Russia’s strategic moves rests are: one, trigger — a justifiable cause that beseeches its intervention; two, local/domestic support for its operations — it cannot afford ruffle feathers if the consequences of an imminent war could make Russians potentially poorer and weaker; three, anticipated military reaction — if the destination country’s forces are week, then so much the better for Mr. Putin; four, technical feasibility — losing tons of troops and armaments in a futile battle does not seem like an ideal end; and five, relatively low anticipated political and economic costs — in a tightly interconnected world, which cannot simply do without it, the perils of antagonising other countries are too onerous to be enlisted here. With the close of the cold war, Russia’s diminutive status in the unipolar world is more than evident. It’s at the mercy of the west, no matter how hard it tries to assert its supremacy by cutting off gas pipelines and displaying ostentatiously its fighter jets. Where these five variables were not met, Russia has refrained from invading, as in the case of Estonia. In 2007, the Bronze Soldier event proved a trigger of sorts for a prospective Russian invasion. But it did not budge. For Estonia was a part of NATO and a military operation simply was not feasible. Plus, it did not help any of Russia’s geopolitical imperatives — namely domestic political consolidation, desire to expand its leverage regionally, and the need shield itself from external threats.
At present, the smart move would be to keep talking, deliberating with officials from Russia. The west must not be afraid to heap huge sanctions and other detrimental pressures on Russia and must be, more importantly, unequivocal in its support for Ukraine. There are no two ways here. With the threat of an imminent conflict escalating on the ground, the crisis has become more of a zero-sum game, and the west, including the NATO must be willing to pay the risks for alienating Russia and possibly getting beneath its allies’ hair. Moreover, it’s also a question of how far Russia is willing to be pragmatic in the choices that it makes. A war can wreak severe political and economic costs for the Russian bear; a harmonious relationship with the West is its best bet. In this person’s opinion, apart from fear of its strategic imperatives being jeopardised, the threat of ‘war’, the hauteur of its diplomats, is nothing but a subterfuge on the part of Russia to gain the world’s attention and assert its non-existent supremacy. After all, Russia needs to do something, once in a while.
The Unsaturated Reader 